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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 44

CPLR 325(d): Damages sought not limited by monetary jurisdiction
in lower court after transfer by supreme court without plaintiff's consent.
Article VI, section 19(a) of the New York State Constitution empowers the supreme court to transfer actions and proceedings over
which it does not have exclusive jurisdiction, independent of the
amount of damages sought, to any other court in the judicial department possessing jurisdiction of the subject matter and over the parties.
It has been noted that this provision is self-executing, thus permitting
75
the supreme court to ease its calendar congestion directly.

The constitution further permits the state legislature to provide
that verdicts or judgments in such transferred actions shall not be subject to the lower monetary jurisdiction of the court to which the action
is transferred.7 6 Accordingly, CPLR Rule 325(d) was enacted in 1968,
and the legislature thereby delegated this power to the appellate division.7 7 To date, calendar conditions in the state have been such that
transfer rules have only been adopted by the appellate divisions in
the third 8 and fourth 79 judicial departments.
Kloc v. Cissell ° affords a recent illustration of the operation of the
transfer rule in the fourth department. The trial court transferred
plaintiff's action to recover damages for personal injuries to a city court
because the potential recovery was, in the court's view, within the
monetary jurisdiction of the city court. However, the trial court had
neglected to consider any of plaintiff's medical testimony. The appellate division nevertheless affirmed in light of the fact that plaintiff
would not be aggrieved by such transfer since his recovery would not
now be limited by the monetary ceiling in the city court.
ARTICLE 10

-

PARTIES GENERALLY

CPLR 1007: Prematuresuit for indemnification not permitted.
Under CPLR 1007, third party indemnity suits are permitted by
defendant "after the service of his answer." However, a premature in75 Frankel Associates, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 607, 610, 257 N.Y.S.2d
555, 558 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN 8: MILLER, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTIcE 325.04 (1968).
76 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 19(k).
77 See 7B MCKINEY'S CPLR 325, supp. commentary 218 (1968).
78 22 NYCRR 861.18 (1969).
79 N.Y. STANDAm CIVIL PRAcTIcE DEsK BOOK, supp. 108 (3d ed. 1969). See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 325, supp. commentary 218, 219 (1968): "In view of the congestion in the
lower courts of the first and second departments, implementing provisions in these departments do not seem to be in the offing."
80 31 App. Div. 2d 885, 298 N.Y.S.2d 107 (4th Dep't 1969).
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

demnity suit (i.e., one instituted before service of an answer) was
permitted in W. T. Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co.8s by the first department where the main suit was instituted in Connecticut, presumably
because the New York courts could not exercise control over that
litigation. 2
Apparently in the absence of the "jurisdictional problem" pre83
sented in a case such as Grant, the courts will not permit such suits.
Thus, in Lasker-Goldman Corp. v. Delma Engineering Corp.,8 4 the

first department recently reversed an order granting plaintiff partial
summary judgment on a cause of action based upon an indemnity
clause. The clause was unambiguous as to defendant's potential liability, but third party complainants had done no more than file claims
for damages at the time judgment was rendered. The plaintiff was

therefore clearly not yet entitled to recovery and the denial of the
motion for summary judgment was proper.
ARTICLE

31 -D ISCLOSURE

CPLR 3101(d): Second department adopts liberal view with regard to
disclosure of witnesses' names.
In Peretz v. Blekicki,8 5 the second department gave appellate
affirmation to the policy, recently promulgated by a supreme court
in that department,"8 of liberal disclosure of a witness' name.
In modifying the lower court decision to allow the disclosure of
the identity of a witness to an accident, unless it appears that such
matter is otherwise privileged under CPLR 3101(c) or (d), the appellate
division relied upon both Hartley v. Ring8 7 and Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.88 In Allen, the Court of Appeals promulgated a

test of "usefulness and reason" which should be liberally construed so
as to require pre-trial disclosure of a witness' name.
The importance of Peretz lies in the fact that it puts the weight

of the appellate division behind the pronouncement previously issued
81 19 App. Div. 2d 361, 243 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Ist Dep't 1963).
82 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3014, supp. commentary 117, 118 (1968).
83 See Lasker-Goldman Corp. v. Delma Eng'r Corp., 32 App. Div. 2d 513, 298 N.Y.S.2d

747 (Ist Dep't 1969); Morey v. Sealright Co., 41 Misc. 2d 1068, 1070, 247 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308-09
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1964).
84 52 App. Div. 2d 513, 298 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Ist Dep't 1969).
85 31 App. Div. 2d 934, 298 N.Y.S.2d 805 (2d Dep't 1969).
86 See Hartley v. Ring, 58 Misc. 2d 618, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1969). See also The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 135, 140

(1969) for an analysis of the history leading to this decision.
8758 Misc. 2d 618, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
88 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968). See also The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice,43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 302, 324-25 (1968).

